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Abstract. An agent may have to choose between actions based on incom-
plete knowledge of its environment. The incomplete knowledge is modelled
as the local state of the agent, which represents the set of states of the envi-
ronment that the agent deems possible. A policy determines a ranking (as a
total preorder) of the set of actions as a function of the local state. A policy
is maximin representable when it is based on a utility function via the max-
imin principle. The theory of Brafman and Tennenholz on necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for policies to be maximin representable is sharpened,
extended, and related to maximax and Laplace representability.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with decision making policies for intelligent agents. Ac-
cording to [8], an agent is a computer system that is situated in some en-
vironment and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment to
meet its design objectives. Intelligent agents are able to perceive their envi-
ronment and respond (in a timely fashion) to changes that occur in it. They
exhibit goal-directed behaviour, and are capable of interacting with other
agents (and possibly humans). In this note, however, we are concerned with
the decision making of an individual agent in an environment that may be
uncertain, but does not contain other agents.
A decisionmaking policy is amethod for the agent to choose an available
action based on information about the environment. Slightly more general,
a preference ranking policy is a ranking of all available actions rather than
making a speciﬁc choice. A preference ranking policy can be based on
estimates of the utilities of actions. The main problem solved in this paper
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is to characterize preference ranking policies based on utility functions via
the so-called maximin principle.
In this effort, we build on the ideas and results of Brafman and Tennen-
holz. Their paper [1] is an outstanding case of concept formation in the sense
of Lakatos [5], with many simple examples and an extensive overview of
the related artiﬁcial intelligence literature. Yet, some technical deﬁnitions
can be improved and some theorems can be sharpened and simpliﬁed. We
also present some new results and many technical examples.
The theory of [1] is characterized by twomodelling decisions. Firstly, the
uncertainty of the agent about its environment is modelled by representing
the agent’s knowledge as a set of possible states of the environment. In order
to compare the agent’s preferences under various circumstances, the agent
is supposed to assign priorities to all available actions. This is formalized
in the concept of policy. The agent is supposed to be purely reactive in the
sense that it does not use knowledge of the history, but only knowledge of the
current state. Of course, the history or a relevant part of it may be encoded
in the current state. So, a policy is a prescription of priorities to actions as a
function of incomplete knowledge of the environment. An agent represents
its incomplete knowledge of the environment in its local state, which is a
nonempty set of states (those it regards as possible). Following [1], we thus
distinguish between the states (of the environment) and the local states (of
the agent); every local state is a nonempty set of states.
A utility function is a function that evaluates an action in a given state.
The maximin principle extends this evaluation to local states by taking the
minimal value for all states in the local state. So, it evaluates the action by
considering a worst-case scenario. A policy is maximin represented by the
utility function when it maximizes this extended utility function.
A preference ranking policy is deterministic when it always gives a com-
plete ranking of the actions. Utility functions do not always force a choice.
It is therefore natural to investigate nondeterministic policies as well.
An important special case is when there are only two actions, e.g., yes
or no, good or bad, true or false. We then speak of binary decisions and
policies. In some sense, the binary case is general enough, since we regard
a policy as a way to choose between any pair of the available actions. In
this paper, however, we emphasize the general case and treat the binary case
only as a corollary of it. Indeed, special methods for the binary case tend to
require proofs with ugly case distinctions.
The paper [1] presents four theorems that axiomatically characterize
maximin representable policies. It does this by generalizing step by step
from special cases. Theorem 1 characterizes deterministic binary policies.
Theorem 2 treats nondeterministic binary policies. General deterministic
policies are handled in Theorem 3, while Theorem 4 is about general non-
Preference rankings in the face of uncertainty 213
deterministic policies. Theorems 2, 3, and 4 each use a different concept of
closure under chains, a weak and complicated form of transitivity.
In all three cases, we replace it by a condition that a certain directed
graph has no cycles. We ﬁrst sharpen Theorem 3 by showing, in Theorem
D, that a deterministic policy is maximin representable if and only if it is
“closed under unions” and a certain graph has no cycles. We then prove
Theorem 1 as a corollary. For nondeterministic policies we also prove, in
TheoremG, that a policy is maximin representable if and only if it is “closed
under unions” and a certain graph has no cycles. This sharpens Theorem 4
of [1]. As a corollary, we give a Theorem G2A for nondeterministic binary
policies sharpeningTheorem2of [1]. It follows that the condition of “respect
of domination” required in Theorem 2 of [1] is superﬂuous.
We also consider the maximax principle where the state-wise evaluation
is extended to local states by taking the maximal value for all states in the
local state. It turns out that a policy is maximin representable if and only
if its opposite is maximax representable, where the opposite of a policy is
obtained by reversing all priorities. This result is especially useful to generate
examples. By comparing maximin and maximax policies, we discover the
“compromise rule” for maximin policies, which says that, if an action x
is better than y for local state L and better than z for local state M , the
combination L ∪ M regards x as better than at least one of the alternatives
y or z. This rule does not hold for maximax policies.
The term “compromise rule” corresponds to a more subjective interpre-
tation of the theory, where the states represent parties rather than possible
states of the environment and where local states represent coalitions of par-
ties that have to reconcile their priorities. In this interpretation, the case with
two states gets extra signiﬁcance, since coalitions of two parties are fairly
common (e.g., marriages). We show that the compromise rule is sufﬁcient
for maximin representability for deterministic policies when there are only
two states.
InLaplace’s principle, the state-wise evaluation is extended to local states
by taking the sum of the values for the states in the local state and preferring
the action for which the sum is maximal. This principle mainly serves here
to generate examples, but we also show that every deterministic policy that
is maximin or maximax representable is also Laplace representable.
Overview
Section 2 formalizes policies and utility functions and provides two simple
examples. We indicate the duality between maximin and maximax policies,
introduce the compromise rule and closure under unions, and we brieﬂy dis-
cuss the Laplace’s principle of indifference which yields a more quantitative
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policy foundation. Section 3 introduces the technical ingredients needed to
axiomatize maximin representability of policies.
In Sect. 4, we introduce acyclic directed graphs and treat maximin rep-
resentability of deterministic policies. We sharpen Theorem 3 of [1] to a
Theorem D by simplifying its condition of closure under chains to acyclic-
ity of a certain graph. We prove that Theorem 1 of [1] is a corollary of
Theorem D. Actually, Theorem D itself is a corollary of Theorem G of
Sect. 5, but for simplicity we give an independent proof. In the deterministic
case with two states, we show that maximin representability is equivalent to
the compromise rule. We ﬁnally prove that every deterministic policy that
is maximin or maximax representable, is also Laplace representable.
In Sect. 5, we treat the general nondeterministic case and prove the main
result, Theorem G, which asserts that a policy is maximin representable if
and only if it is closed under unions and a certain directed graph is acyclic.
This is a sharpened version of Theorem4 of [1]. In Sect. 6, we prove a similar
result for the binary case, which corresponds to Theorem 2 of [1]. This result
is considerably harder to prove, but employs acyclicity of a smaller graph
and is therefore, in applications, computationally cheaper. We conclude in
Sect. 7.
Related work
As seen above, our main reference is [1]. We refer to [1,3] for extensive
overviews of related literature. At ﬁrst sight, the inhibition relation described
in [8], p. 24, looks similar to the approach investigated here. This is decep-
tive, however, for the inhibition relation is used to deﬁne a single function
from percepts, which represent knowledge of the environment, to actions.
Preference ranking based on voting procedures is the subject of social choice
theory, e.g., see [6] and references given there.
Notations
We replace the deﬁnitions and arguments by case distinctions in natural
language of [1] by more concise formulas in predicate logic, in a version as
suggested by [2]. So, we use ≡ for logical equivalence, ∧ for conjunction
(and), ∨ for disjunction (or), ⇒ for implication, ¬ for negation. Universal
and existential quantiﬁcation of a predicate R(x) with x ranging over a
set X is denoted by (∀ x ∈ X :: R(x)) and (∃ x ∈ X :: R(x)). If f
is a numerical function on X , a similar notation is used for the minimum
(MIN x ∈ X :: f(x)) and the sum (∑ x ∈ X :: f(x)). We write #V for
the number of elements of a set V . At some points, we also use the format
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of [2] to give predicate calculations with hints between braces to justify the
steps.
2 Policies and utility functions
This section contains the main deﬁnitions. Given ﬁnite sets States and
Actions, we deﬁne policies as functions that yield total preorders onActions,
with deterministic policies as special cases. We deﬁne utility functions as
numerical functions on action-state pairs. We deﬁne three ways to associate
a policy to a utility function: maximin, maximax, and Laplace. We give ex-
amples of such induced policies. We deﬁne duality of policies and introduce
two important properties of policies: the compromise rule and closure under
unions.
Assigning preferences is formalized by giving a total order if the policy
is deterministic. Since there is sometimes no reason to prefer one action over
another one, we also consider nondeterministic policies, which assign total
preorders to local states.
Recall that a binary relation 	 is called a preorder iff it is reﬂexive and
transitive. The associated relations ≺ and ≈ are then deﬁned by
x ≺ y ≡ ¬ (y 	 x) ,
x ≈ y ≡ x 	 y ∧ y 	 x .
Preorder 	 is called total (or linear) iff x ≺ y implies x 	 y for all x and
y. If 	 is total, then ≺ is transitive (in other cases ≺ is rather useless). The
preorder 	 is an order if and only if relation ≈ equals the identity relation.
For a total preorderT , we use	T to denote the corresponding inﬁx operator,
and we use ≺T and ≈T for the two associated relations. Total preorders are
called “simple orderings” in [7] and “weak orders” in [3].
Since we aim at a general theory, we use the term policy for what is
called a generalized s-policy in [1]. Let States be a nonempty ﬁnite set.
The elements of States are called states and represent the possible states of
the environment. We deﬁne the set LocSt as the set of nonempty subsets
of States. The elements of LocSt are called local states, and represent the
agent’s incomplete knowledge of the environment. Local states are called
“events” in the probabilistic tradition of [7,3].
Let Actions be a ﬁnite set with at least two elements. A policy P is
deﬁned to be a function from LocSt to the set of total preorders on Actions.
For local stateL and actions x and y, we write x 	PL y instead of x 	P (L) y,
and similarly with 	 replaced by ≺ and ≈. Policy P is called deterministic
iff 	PL is a total order for every local state L, or equivalently iff x ≈PL y
implies x = y for all actions x and y.
Wedeﬁne anaction-state pair to be a pair (x, s)wherex is an action and s
is a state.We thus deﬁne the setAS-pairs as the cartesian productAS-pairs =
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Actions × States. Policies are sometimes based on “utility” of action-state
pairs. A utility functionu is deﬁned as a functionu : AS-pairs → IR. In order
to get the best worst-case outcome for a policy, we extend utility function
u to local states by giving the worst-case utility u∗(x, L) = (MIN s ∈ L ::
u(x, s)). A policy P is said to be maximin represented by utility function u,
cf. [1], iff for all L, x and y
(0) x 	PL y ≡ u∗(x, L) ≤ u∗(y, L) .
It is easy to see that we then also have
(1) x ≺PL y ≡ u∗(x, L) < u∗(y, L) .
Example A. Take three actions x, y, z and three states a, b, c. Let utility
function u be given by the columns of a, b, c in the table
u a b c u∗ : ab ac bc abc
x 0 5 3 0 0 3 0
y 0 4 1 0 0 1 0
z 2 6 1 2 1 1 1
So, for example, u(x, b) = 5. In the columns of ab, ac, bc, abc, we
give the values of u∗ for the local states {a, b}, {a, c}, etc. For exam-
ple, u∗(x, {b, c}) = 3. Let P be the policy that is maximin represented
by utility function u. It is easy to see that P ({a}) is the preorder with
x ≈ y ≺ z, that P ({b}) is the order with y ≺ x ≺ z, and that
P ({c}) is the preorder with y ≈ z ≺ x. For the larger local states,
the policies are P ({a, b}) = P ({a, c}) = P ({a, b, c}) = P ({a}) and
P ({b, c}) = P ({c}). unionsq
If P is an arbitrary policy, its opposite or dual is deﬁned as the policy Q
given by
x 	QL y ≡ y 	PL x for all x, y, L.
It is easy to see that, conversely, P is the opposite of Q.
Next to its worst-case extension u∗, every utility function u has also a
best-case extension u∗ given by u∗(x, L) = (MAX s ∈ L :: u(x, s)). A
policy P is said to be maximax represented by utility function u iff for all
L, x and y
x 	PL y ≡ u∗(x, L) ≤ u∗(y, L) .
The maximax representation is based on the optimistic idea to aim at the
best possible outcome.
The fundamental alternative to maximin and maximax representability is
Laplace’s principle of indifference [1] in which the action maximizing the
sum of the values is preferred. Writing u#(x, L) for (
∑
s ∈ L :: u(x, s)),
we deﬁne policy P to be Laplace represented by u iff
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x 	PL y ≡ u#(x, L) ≤ u#(y, L) .
As a referee suggested, it is useful to note that Laplace representation has
a probabilistic interpretation, cf. [7]: it maximizes the expected utility of
actions under assumption that the states have equal probabilities.
The following duality theorem shows that the maximin and maximax
principles are two sides of the same coin. It also shows that Laplace repre-
sentability is self-dual.
Duality Theorem. (a) Policy P is maximin represented by utility function
u if and only if its opposite policy is maximax represented by the utility
function −u.
(b) Policy P is Laplace represented by utility function u if and only if its
opposite policy is Laplace represented by the utility function −u.
Proof. (a) This follows from
(−u)∗(x, L)
= (MAX s ∈ L :: −u(x, s))
= −(MIN s ∈ L :: u(x, s))
= −u∗(x, L) .
Therefore (−u)∗(y, L) ≤ (−u)∗(x, L) ≡ u∗(x, L) ≤ u∗(y, L).
(b) This is proved in the same way. unionsq
Below we show that not every maximax representable policy is maximin
representable (and also the other way around). In order to prove this, we
need to develop conditions necessary for maximin representability.
A typical property of a maximin representable policy P is the following
compromise rule
(2) y ≺PL x ∧ z ≺PM x ⇒ y ≺PL∪M x ∨ z ≺PL∪M x .
Indeed, if u∗(y, L) < u∗(x, L) and u∗(z,M) < u∗(x,M), then the mini-
mum of u∗(y, L∪M) and u∗(z, L∪M) is less than u∗(x, L∪M). We call
it the compromise rule, since the antecedent says that x is better than y for
L and better than z for M , while the consequent says that L and M regard
x as a compromise at least better than one of the alternatives y and z.
Example B. We show that not every maximax policy is a maximin policy by
constructing a (deterministic) maximax policy that violates the compromise
rule. We use three actions x, y, z, two states a and b, and let P be the policy
that is maximax represented by the function u given in the table
u a b u∗ : ab
x 1 1 1
y 3 0 3
z 0 4 4
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It follows that the total orders are given by P ({a}) : z ≺ x ≺ y and
P ({b}) : y ≺ x ≺ z and P ({a, b}) : x ≺ y ≺ z. Policy P clearly violates
the compromise rule for L = {b} and M = {a}. unionsq
The paper [1] does not mention the compromise rule but emphasizes
what is called closure under unions. A policy P is said to be closed under
unions, cf. [1], iff for local states L and M , and actions x and y, we always
have
x 	PL y ∧ x 	PM y ⇒ x 	PL∪M y ,
x ≺PL y ∧ x ≺PM y ⇒ x ≺PL∪M y .
Every maximin representable policy is closed under unions. This is proved
in the same way as the compromise rule for such policies. It is also easy to
verify that a policy P is closed under unions if and only if its opposite is.
By Duality Theorem, it follows that every maximax representable policy is
also closed under unions.
Laplace representable policies are not necessarily closed under unions.
For example, ifQ is the policyLaplace-representedby functionuofExample
A, then z 	QL x for both L = {a, c} and L = {b, c}, but not for the union
L = {a, b, c}. They are closed under disjoint unions. More precisely, every
Laplace representable policy Q satisﬁes the following “Laplace rules”:
x 	QL y ∧ x ≺QM y ∧ L ∩ M = ∅ ⇒ x ≺QL∪M y ,
x ≈QL y ∧ x ≈QM y ∧ L ∩ M = ∅ ⇒ x ≈QL∪M y .
For example, policy P of Example A is not Laplace representable, since the
ﬁrst Laplace rule fails for L = {a} and M = {b}. The policy of Example
B is Laplace represented by the utility function u used there. This shows
that Laplace representable policies can be closed under unions and need not
satisfy the compromise rule.
The axiomatization of Laplace representable policies is a nice problem,
but since it seems to require completely different techniques (like linear
programming), we leave it aside.
3 Two critical relations on action-state pairs
Our aim is to ﬁnd necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for policy P to be
maximin representable. It seems that the compromise rule, though neces-
sary, is not very useful. Closure under unions is also necessary, but clearly
insufﬁcient because of Example B. In this section we introduce binary re-
lations ≺P• and 	P• on AS-pairs, the properties of which will determine the
maximin representability of P .
It turns out that, if policy P is closed under unions, it is determined by
its behaviour on sets of states with ≤ 2 elements or, more precisely, by
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two induced relations on AS-pairs. Indeed, inspired by [1], we deﬁne for an
arbitrary policy P , relations ≺P• and 	P• on action-state pairs by
(3) (x, s) ≺P• (y, t) ≡
(s = t ∧ x ≺P{t} y) ∨ (x ≺P{s,t} y ∧ y 	P{t} x) ,
(x, s) 	P• (y, t) ≡
(s = t ∧ x 	P{t} y) ∨ (x 	P{s,t} y ∧ y ≺P{t} x) .
For action-state pairs with the same states s = t, relation ≺P• equals ≺P{t}
and 	P• equals 	P{t}. For pairs with the different states s = t, the relations
indicate that the states differ in their preferences with respect to the actions
involved.
Note that, in either case, the second disjunct implies s = t. So, in this
case, the operator∨ serves as an exclusive or. Relation≺P• may have cycles
and is not necessarily transitive, as is shown in the next example.
Example B, continued. Policy P of Example B has the cycle (x, a) ≺P•
(y, b) ≺P• (z, a) ≺P• (x, a). Indeed, relation (x, a) ≺P• (y, b) is proved by
observing that x ≺ y in local state {a, b} whereas y ≺ x in local state {b}.
Relation (y, b) ≺P• (z, a) is proved in the same way. Relation (z, a) ≺P•
(x, a) follows from z ≺ x in local state {a}. Since (x, a) ≺P• (z, a) is false,
this also shows that ≺P• need not be transitive. unionsq
The next result justiﬁes the deﬁnitions of ≺P• and 	P• in relation to the
maximin principle.
Lemma 4. Let policy P be maximin represented by utility function u. For
action-state pairs (x, s) and (y, t), we have
(a) (x, s) ≺P• (y, t) ⇒ u(x, s) < u(y, t) ,
(b) (x, s) 	P• (y, t) ⇒ u(x, s) ≤ u(y, t) .
Proof. (a) Assume (x, s) ≺P• (y, t). Relation ≺P• is given in (3) by a dis-
junction. If s = t and x ≺P{t} y, we have u∗(x, {t}) < u∗(y, {t}) and hence
u(x, s) < u(y, t) since s = t. We treat the second disjunct by observing
that
x ≺P{s,t} y ∧ y 	P{t} x
≡ {(1) and (0)}
u∗(x, {s, t}) < u∗(y, {s, t}) ∧ u∗(y, {t}) ≤ u∗(x, {t})
≡ {deﬁnition of u∗}
min(u(x, s), u(x, t)) < min(u(y, s), u(y, t)) ∧
u(y, t) ≤ u(x, t)
⇒ {use the second conjunct to rewrite the ﬁrst conjunct}
u(x, s) < min(u(y, s), u(y, t))
⇒ {calculus}
u(x, s) < u(y, t) .
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Case (b) is similar. unionsq
The next result is another justiﬁcation for the deﬁnition of ≺P• and 	P• .
It shows that, if P is closed under unions, it is determined by ≺P• and 	P• ,
i.e., by its behaviour on sets of states with ≤ 2 elements.
Lemma 5. Let policy P be closed under unions. Let L be a local state and
let x and y be actions. Then we have
(a) x ≺PL y ≡ (∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: (x, s) ≺P• (y, t))) ,
(b) x 	PL y ≡ (∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: (x, s) 	P• (y, t))) .
Proof. (a) The proof is by mutual implication. Assume the righthand side:
(6) (∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: (x, s) ≺P• (y, t))) .
Let Q be the set of the sets M = {s, t} such that s, t ∈ L and (x, s) ≺P•
(y, t). Then L is the union of Q and x ≺PM y for all M in Q. Using closure
under unions for ≺P , we get x ≺PL y.
Conversely, assume that formula (6) is false. Then we can choose a state
t0 ∈ L such that ¬(x, s) ≺P• (y, t0) holds for all s ∈ L. By the rule of De
Morgan, ¬(x, s) ≺P• (y, t0) is equivalent to
(s = t0 ∨ y 	P{t0} x) ∧ (y 	P{s,t0} x ∨ x ≺P{t0} y) .
Applying this to s := t0, we ﬁnd that y 	P{t0} x. It follows that y 	P{s,t0} x
holds for all s ∈ L.We canwriteL as the union of the sets {s, t0}with s ∈ L.
Using closure under unions for 	P , we get y 	PL x, that is ¬ (x ≺PL y).
(b) The proof of this is completely analogous, with ≺P and 	P inter-
changed consistently. unionsq
We regard the validity of Lemma 5 as a miracle. Conversely, however,
it is easy to verify that a policy is closed under unions when it satisﬁes (a)
and (b) for all L, x, and y. Lemma 5 is the key to the following converse of
Lemma 4.
Lemma 7. Let policy P be closed under unions. Let u be a utility function
that, for all pairs of action-state pairs (x, s) and (y, t) with x = y, satisﬁes
(a) (x, s) ≺P• (y, t) ⇒ u(x, s) < u(y, t) ,
(b) (x, s) 	P• (y, t) ⇒ u(x, s) ≤ u(y, t) .
Then P is maximin represented by utility function u.
Proof. It sufﬁces to prove, for all pairs of actions x = y, and all local states
L,
(8) x 	PL y ≡ u∗(x, L) ≤ u∗(y, L) .
We ﬁrst prove that the negation of the lefthand side implies the negation of
the righthand side.
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y ≺PL x
≡ {Lemma 5(a)}
(∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: (y, s) ≺P• (x, t)))
⇒ {x = y and condition (a)}
(∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: u(y, s) < u(x, t)))
⇒ {choose t ∈ L with u(x, t) = u∗(x, L)}
u∗(y, L) < u∗(x, L) .




(∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: (x, s) 	P• (y, t)))
⇒ {x = y and condition (b)}
(∀ t ∈ L :: (∃ s ∈ L :: u(x, s) ≤ u(y, t)))
⇒ {choose t ∈ L with u(y, t) = u∗(y, L)}
u∗(x, L) ≤ u∗(y, L) . unionsq
The Lemmas 4 and 7 are the key results needed for our main theorems D
and G in the Sects. 4 and 5 below.
4 Acyclicity and the deterministic cases
This section contains our results on deterministic policies. The main result
is that a deterministic policy is maximin representable if and only if it is
closed under unions and relation ≺P• is acyclic. We therefore need to deﬁne
and investigate acyclicity of binary relations ﬁrst.
Lemma 7 suggests to construct utility function u in some way from the
relations ≺P• and 	P• . Since we can reuse the following construction in a
different context, we generalize the setting.
Recall that a binary relation R on a set X is called acyclic iff, for every
sequence of elements x0, . . . , xm of X with m > 0 and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R
for 0 ≤ i < m, it holds that x0 = xm. In general, we deﬁne the R-level
of an element x ∈ X to be the maximal number m for which there exists
a sequence x0, . . . , xm such that m ≥ 0 and xm = x and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R
for all 0 ≤ i < m. The R-level of x is inﬁnite if such sequences can be
arbitrarily long. We need the following well-known result.
Lemma 9. A relationR on a ﬁnite setX is acyclic if and only if allR-levels
are ﬁnite.
Proof. Let Y be the set of elements of X with inﬁnite R-levels. We prove
that R has a cycle if and only if Y is nonempty. If relation R has a cycle, all
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elements of the cycle belong to Y . So Y is nonempty. Conversely, assume
that Y is nonempty. For every y ∈ Y , ﬁniteness of X implies the existence
of an element z ∈ Y with (z, y) ∈ R. Inductively, we can therefore ﬁnd an
inﬁnite backward path in Y . Since the set Y is ﬁnite, this path contains a
cycle. unionsq
The following algorithm, a variation of the classical algorithm for topo-
logical sorting, determines the R-levels of all elements of a ﬁnite set X .
var lev : array X of integer ;
var Rest := X ; var i := 0 ;
var First := {x ∈ Rest | (∀ y ∈ Rest :: (y, x) /∈ R)} ;
while First = ∅ do
for all x ∈ First do lev(x) := i end ;
Rest := Rest \ First ; i := i + 1 ;
First := {x ∈ Rest | (∀ y ∈ Rest :: (y, x) /∈ R)} ;
end .
In the postcondition, lev(x) is the R-level of x for every x with ﬁnite level,
and Rest holds all elements of X with inﬁnite R-levels. So, Rest is empty
if and only if R is acyclic.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the case that policy P is
deterministic. This means that x 	PL y is equivalent to x = y or x ≺PL y
for every pair of actions x, y, and every local state L. We now have the
deterministic theorem:
TheoremD. Let policyP bedeterministic. ThenP ismaximin representable
if andonly ifP is closed under unions and relation≺P• onAS-pairs is acyclic.
Proof. First assume that policyP is maximin represented by utility function
u. In Sect. 2, we saw that P is closed under unions. For any chain of action-
state pairs (x0, s0) ≺P• . . . ≺P• (xm, sm), we have u(x0, s0) < . . . <
u(xm, sm) by Lemma 4(a). Therefore, relation ≺P• is acyclic.
Conversely, assume that P is closed under unions and that relation≺P• is
acyclic. Let lev be the corresponding ≺P• -level function on AS-pairs. Then
lev can be used as a utility function and it satisﬁes
(x, s) ≺P• (y, t) ⇒ lev(x, s) < lev(y, t) .
Since P is deterministic, it follows from (3) that
(x, s) 	P• (y, t) ≡ (x, s) = (y, t) ∨ (x, s) ≺P• (y, t) .
We therefore also have
(x, s) 	P• (y, t) ⇒ lev(x, s) ≤ lev(y, t) .
By Lemma 7, it follows that P is maximin represented by utility function
lev. unionsq
Preference rankings in the face of uncertainty 223
Remark. This is a sharpened version of Theorem 3 of [1]. Assuming closure
under unions, one can prove that (x, s) ≺P• (y, t) is equivalent to the deﬁning
expression for (x, s) <P (y, t) in Deﬁnition 10 of [1]. This Deﬁnition then
proceeds to deﬁne <P to be closed under chains if whenever (a1, s1) <P
. . . <P (ak, sk) and either (1) a1 ≺P{s1} ak and ak ≺P{sk} a1 or (2) s1 = sk,
then (a1, s1) <P (ak, sk). Using case (2), one easily sees that relation<P is
acyclic when it is closed under chains. Theorem 3 of [1] asserts that, if policy
P is deterministic and closed under unions and <P is closed under chains,
then P is maximin representable. This result now follows from Theorem D
above. So, Theorem 3 of [1] is correct, but its deﬁnition of closure under
chains is needlessly complicated, since case (1) is superﬂuous. unionsq
In the special case where P is deterministic and binary, the acyclicity
requirement can be lifted since it always holds. This is shown in the next
result.
Theorem D2A. Assume that P is deterministic and that #Actions = 2.
Then P is maximin representable if and only if it is closed under unions.
Proof. In view of Theorem D, it sufﬁces to prove that, in this case, closure
under unions implies acyclicity of relation ≺P• .
Consider a cycle of m > 0 action-state pairs (xi, si) with 0 ≤ i ≤ m
such that (xi, si) ≺P• (xi+1, si+1) for 0 ≤ i < m and (x0, s0) = (xm, sm).
For every i with 0 ≤ i < m, formula (3) implies that xi ≺PM xi+1 with
M = {si, si+1}. It follows that xi = xi+1. Since there are only two actions,
this implies that m is even, and that x2i = x0 and x2i+1 = x1 for all i.
Consider the local state L = {sk | 0 ≤ k < m}. We can write L in two
ways as a disjoint union of subsequent pairs, namely pairs {s2i, s2i+1} with
0 ≤ i < 12m, and pairs {s2i+1, s2i+2} with 0 ≤ i < 12m. Since P is
closed under unions, the ﬁrst representation implies x0 ≺PL x1. Similarly,
the second representation implies x1 ≺PL x0. This contradicts the fact that
	PL is a preorder. unionsq
Using Lemma 11 below, one can show that Theorem D2A is equivalent
to Theorem 1 of [1]. As indicated in the introduction, the case with only
two states has also special signiﬁcance under certain interpretations of the
theory. In this case, the compromise rule plays a role.
Theorem D2S. Assume that P is deterministic and that #States = 2. Then
P is maximin representable if and only if it satisﬁes the compromise rule
(2).
Proof. The compromise rule was introduced in Sect. 2 as a property of
all maximin representable policies. It therefore sufﬁces to prove the other
implication. Assume that P is deterministic and satisﬁes the compromise
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rule. This easily implies closure under unions. In view of Theorem D, it
therefore remains to show that relation ≺P• is acyclic. Let a step (x, s) ≺P•
(y, t) be called state-changing when s = t.
Assume that relation ≺P• has a cycle. Since the restriction of ≺P• to
action-state pairs with the same state is a total order, the cycle contains at
least two state-changing steps. Let E be the set of action-state pairs p for
which the cycle contains some state-changing step p ≺P• q. We compare the
action-state pairs in E by means of the total order 	PS , where S = States.
We can choose (i, s) ∈ E such that i is minimal with respect to 	PS . Let
(i, s) ≺P• (k, t) for some (k, t) with s = t. Since #S = 2, we have
S = {s, t} and i ≺PS k and k ≺P{t} i.
Let (p, t) ≺P• (j, s) be the last state-changing step of the cycle before
action-state pair (i, s). Then (p, t) ∈ E, so i 	PS p by minimality. On the
other hand, p ≺PS j because of (p, t) ≺P• (j, s). This implies i ≺PS j and,
hence, i = j. Finally, we have j ≺P{s} i since the cycle goes from (j, s) to
(i, s) without state changes. We thus have
j ≺P{s} i ∧ k ≺P{t} i ∧ i ≺PS j ∧ i ≺PS k .
This contradicts the compromise rule (2) for L = {s} and M = {t}. unionsq
In this result, the assumption #States = 2 is essential, as is shown by
the next example.
Example C. We give a determinisitic policy P for a system with three states
a, b, c and four actions 0, 1, 2, 3, that satisﬁes the compromise rule and is
not maximin representable. Policy P is given by listing the local states as
strings of states with the corresponding orders:
local states order
a, ab : 3 ≺ 0 ≺ 2 ≺ 1 .
b : 3 ≺ 1 ≺ 0 ≺ 2 .
c, ac : 0 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 1 .
bc : 0 ≺ 3 ≺ 1 ≺ 2 .
abc : 0 ≺ 3 ≺ 2 ≺ 1 .
The policy is notmaximin representable because of the four-cycle (0, a) ≺P•
(1, b) ≺P• (2, c) ≺P• (3, a) ≺P• (0, a). The veriﬁcation of the cycle and of
the compromise rule can be done by hand, but we used the computer to
generate this case by an exhaustive search with the functional language
Haskell [4]. One can verify that this policy is Laplace representable with
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utility function u given by
u a b c u# : ab ac bc abc
0 1 2 0 3 1 2 3
1 8 1 5 9 13 6 14
2 2 6 1 8 3 7 9
3 0 0 4 0 4 4 4
unionsq
In Example A, we gave a nondeterministicmaximin representable policy
that was not Laplace representable. We now show that nondeterminism was
essential.
Theorem DL. Let P be a deterministic policy that is maximin or maximax
representable. Then P is Laplace representable.
Proof. We ﬁrst treat the case that P is maximax represented by utility func-
tion u. Let N be the number of states. Since the maximax principle only
uses the order of the values of u and since the number of action-state pairs
is ﬁnite, we may assume that u(x, s) ≥ 0 for all action-state pairs (x, s) and
that, for all pairs of action-state pairs (x, s) and (y, t), we have
(*) u(x, s) < u(y, t) ⇒ N · u(x, s) < u(y, t) .
For actions x and y, and local state L, we now observe
u∗(x, L) < u∗(y, L)
⇒ { deﬁnition u∗ }
(∃ t ∈ L :: (∀ s ∈ L :: u(x, s) < u(y, t)))
⇒ { (*) }
(∃ t ∈ L :: (∀ s ∈ L :: N · u(x, s) < u(y, t)))
⇒ { calculus and deﬁnition u# }
(∃ t ∈ L :: u#(x, L) < u(y, t))
⇒ { calculus and deﬁnition u# }
u#(x, L) < u#(y, L) .
Since policy P is deterministic and maximax represented by u, it follows
that
x 	PL y ≡ u#(x, L) ≤ u#(y, L) .
This proves that P is Laplace represented by u.
Now, assume that P is maximin representable. Then its opposite is maxi-
max representable and therefore Laplace representable. By the Duality The-
orem, it follows that P itself is Laplace representable. unionsq
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5 Acyclicity and the nondeterministic Theorem G
In this section, we treat the general case of nondeterministic policies.
We ﬁrst generalize the concept of acyclicity in the following way. Let
a pair of binary relations (R,S) be called acyclic iff, for every sequence
of elements x0, . . . , xm of X with m > 0 and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R ∪ S for
all 0 ≤ i < m and (xi, xi+1) ∈ R for at least one index i, it holds that
x0 = xm. It is easy to see that a pair of binary relations (R,S) is acyclic if
and only if the relation R ◦ S∗ is acyclic, where
R ◦ S∗ = {(x, y) | (∃ z :: (x, z) ∈ R ∧ (z, y) ∈ S∗)}
is the relational composition of relationRwith the reﬂexive transitive closure
S∗ of relation S.
This concept of acyclicity replaces the three concepts of “closure under
chains” of [1], Deﬁnitions 7, 10, 14.
Lemma 10. Let (R,S) be a pair of binary relations on a ﬁnite set X . The
pair (R,S) is acyclic if and only if there is a numerical function f on X
with
(a) If (x, y) ∈ R, then f(x) < f(y).
(b) If (x, y) ∈ S, then f(x) ≤ f(y).
Proof. Let us write T = R ◦ S∗. First, assume that a function f with the
proposed properties exist. Then f(x) < f(y) for all (x, y) ∈ T . It follows
that relation T is acyclic, so that the pair (R,S) is acyclic. Conversely,
assume that the pair is acyclic, so that T is acyclic. The function T -level
then satisﬁes the conditions (a) and (b). unionsq
TheoremG. A policy P is maximin representable if and only if P is closed
under unions and the pair of relations (≺P• ,	P• ) on AS-pairs is acyclic.
Proof. First, assume that P is maximin represented by utility function u. In
Sect. 2, we saw that this implies that P is closed under unions. It follows
from Lemma 4 that function u satisﬁes the condition of Lemma 10, so that
the pair (≺P• ,	P• ) is acyclic.
Conversely, assume that P is closed under unions and that the pair
(≺P• ,	P• ) is acyclic. By Lemma 10, there is a utility function f that satisﬁes
the requirements of Lemma 7 and hence yields a maximin representation of
policy P . unionsq
Remarks. The utility function f obtained via the proof of Lemma 10 is the
T -level function for relation T = (≺P• ) ◦ (	P• )∗.
Theorem G is inspired by Theorem 4 of [1], which however does not
give a necessary condition for maximin representability. In fact, it requires
that a certain relation =P is closed under chains which property implies
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that, whenever (a1, s1) =P . . . =P (ak, sk) and a1 = ak and s1 = sk and
a1 	P{s1} ak and ak 	P{sk} a1 then (a1, s1) =P (ak, sk). This condition is
not necessary for maximin representability. Relation =P is deﬁned in [1] in
such a way that, in our terms, (x, s) =P (y, t) is equivalent to
(s = t ∧ x ≈P{s} y) ∨
(s = t ∧ x = y ∧ x 	P{s} y ∧ y 	P{t} x ∧ x ≈P{s,t} y) .
One can verify that, in Example A, we have the relations (x, a) =P
(y, b) =P (z, c). Moreover x = z and a = c and x 	P{a} z and z 	P{c} x.
But the conclusion of closure under chains that (x, a) =P (z, c) should
hold, is false. This shows that closure under chains does not follow from
maximin representability, as is asserted in [1]. unionsq
Example D. We now construct a nondeterministic binary policy P , that is
closed under unions and satisﬁes the compromise rule but is neithermaximin
nor maximax representable. We use two actions x and y, and four states a,
b, c, d. Policy P is given by listing the local states as strings of states with
the corresponding preorders:
local states preorder
a, c, ab, ac, abc : x ≺ y .
b, d, bc, bd, bcd : y ≺ x .
ad, cd, abd, acd, abcd : x ≈ y .
In this case, a tedious veriﬁcation is needed to verify that P is closed under
unions. Since there are only two actions, it is easy to see that the compromise
rule (2) follows from closure under unions. A tedious veriﬁcation shows
that we have a four-cycle (x, a) ≺P• (y, b) ≺P• (x, c) 	P• (y, d) 	P• (x, a).
Therefore, P is not maximin representable.
In order to show that P is not maximax representable, it sufﬁces by
Duality Theorem to prove that its opposite is not maximin representable.
Let Q be the opposite of P . In general, for opposite policies P and Q, we
have the rules
(x, s) ≺P• (y, t) ≡ (y, s) ≺Q• (x, t) ,
(x, s) 	P• (y, t) ≡ (y, s) 	Q• (x, t) .
Therefore, the above four-cycle induces the four-cycle (y, a) ≺Q• (x, b) ≺Q•
(y, c) 	Q• (x, d) 	Q• (y, a). As above, this shows that Q is not maximin
representable so that P is not maximax representable. unionsq
6 The nondeterministic binary case
This section is devoted the nondeterministic binary case and in particu-
lar to Theorem G2A, which sharpens Theorem 2 of [1]. So, we assume
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#Actions = 2. Of course, Theorem G is applicable to this case and relates
maximin representability to acyclicity of relations on AS-pairs. In the bi-
nary case, Theorem 2 of [1] relates maximin representability to acyclicity
of relations on the smaller set States.
Since #Actions = 2, there are only three total preorders on Actions:
either element can be the greatest one, or they are equivalent. In other
words, the total preorder 	 is determined by the set of the greatest elements
Gr(	) = {x | (∀ y :: y 	 x)}. It follows that a policy P is determined by
the values P [L] = Gr(	PL ). Note that P [L] always consists of one or two
actions, i.e., we have #P [L] = 1 or #P [L] = 2.
Since we want to retain the general deﬁnitions in the special case, we
ﬁrst prove that the special deﬁnition of [1] indeed corresponds to the general
deﬁnition:
Lemma 11. The following conditions on P are equivalent:
(a) P is closed under unions.
(b) For all L, M ∈ LocSt, we have P [L] ∩ P [M ] ⊆ P [L ∪ M ] ⊆ P [L] ∪
P [M ].
(c) For all L, M ∈ LocSt, the set P [L ∪ M ] equals P [L] or P [M ] or
P [L] ∪ P [M ].
Proof. We ﬁrst prove (a)≡ (b). Closure under unions is a conjunction of two
implications universally quantiﬁed over actions x and y and local states L
and M . Both implications are trivial for x = y. So, assume that x = y.
Since #Actions = 2, the implications are equivalent to
y ∈ P [L] ∧ y ∈ P [M ] ⇒ y ∈ P [L ∪ M ] ,
x /∈ P [L] ∧ x /∈ P [M ] ⇒ x /∈ P [L ∪ M ] .
These are the two set inclusions of (b).
Since P [K] is a nonempty subset of Actions for every local state K,
and since #Actions = 2, the veriﬁcation of (b)≡ (c) is a matter of case
distinctions. unionsq
For simplicity, we abbreviate P [{s}] and P [{s, t}] to P [s] and P [s, t] for
all states s and t. Occasionally we abbreviate Actions to A.
Following [1], we deﬁne relations >P and =P on States as follows
s >P t ≡ P [s] = P [s, t] = P [t] ,
s =P t ≡ P [s] ∩ P [t] = ∅ ∧ P [s, t] = Actions .
As a ﬁrst justiﬁcation of these deﬁnitions, we prove
Lemma 12. Assume that P is maximin represented by utility function u.
Let function m on states be given by m(s) = (MIN x :: u(x, s)) where x
ranges over the two actions.
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(a) Assume s >P t and #P [s] = 1. Then m(s) < m(t) and #P [t] ≤ 2.
(b) Assume s >P t and #P [s] = 2. Then m(s) ≤ m(t) and #P [t] ≤ 1.
(c) Assume s =P t. Then m(s) = m(t) and #P [s] = #P [t] = 1.
Proof. We assume that x and y are the two elements ofA. In all three cases,
the assertion on #P [t] (and #P [s]) is easy and can be left to the reader.
(a) We may assume that {x} = P [s] = P [s, t] = P [t]. It follows
that m(s) = u(y, s) < u(x, s) and u∗(y, {s, t}) < u∗(x, {s, t}) and
m(t) = u(x, t) ≤ u(y, t). Therefore, u∗(y, {s, t}) < u∗(x, {s, t}) ≤
u(x, t) ≤ u(y, t), which implies u(y, s) = u∗(y, {s, t}) and hence m(s) <
u∗(x, {s, t}) ≤ u(x, t) = m(t).
(b) We may assume that {x} = P [t], while P [s] = P [s, t] = A. It
follows that m(t) = u(y, t) < u(x, t) and m(s) = u(x, s) = u(y, s) and
u∗(y, {s, t}) = u∗(x, {s, t}). Therefore, u∗(x, {s, t}) ≤ u(y, t) < u(x, t)
and hence m(s) = u(x, s) = u∗(x, {s, t}) = u∗(y, {s, t}) ≤ u(y, t) =
m(t).
(c) We may assume that P [s] = {x} and P [t] = {y}. Then m(s) =
u(y, s) < u(x, s) and m(t) = u(x, t) < u(y, t), while u∗(y, {s, t}) =
u∗(x, {s, t}). It follows that u∗(y, {s, t}) ≤ u(x, t) < u(y, t) so that
u(y, s) = u∗(y, {s, t}) = u∗(x, {s, t}) ≤ u(x, t), that is m(s) ≤ m(t). By
symmetry, we get m(s) = m(t). unionsq
Corollary 13. Assume that policy P is maximin representable. Then the
pair of relations (>P ,=P ) on States is acyclic.
Proof. We use function m of Lemma 12. Since the set States is ﬁnite, there
is a real number ε > 0 such that m(s) < m(t) implies m(s)+ 2 · ε ≤ m(t)
for all pairs of states s and t. We now deﬁne function f on states by f(s) =
m(s) − ε · #P [s]. It follows from Lemma 12 that, for all s and t,
s >P t ⇒ f(s) < f(t) ,
s =P t ⇒ f(s) = f(t) .
Now Lemma 10 implies that the pair (>P ,=P ) is acyclic. unionsq
Conversely, assume that the pair (>P ,=P ) is acyclic.Weuse the function
level associated to relation T = (>P )◦(=P )∗ and deﬁne the utility function
plev on AS-pairs by
plev(x, s) = level(s) if x /∈ P [s] ∨ P [s] = A,
plev(x, s) = Large if x ∈ P [s] = A,
where Large is a number larger than all values of level.
Lemma 14. Assume that P is closed under unions and that relation
(>P ,=P ) is acyclic. Let x = y in Actions.
(a) If (x, s) ≺P• (y, t), then plev(x, s) < plev(y, t).
(b) If (x, s) 	P• (y, t), then plev(x, s) ≤ plev(y, t).
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Proof. (a)By the deﬁnitions ofP and≺P• , the assumption of (a) is equivalent
to
(s = t ∧ x /∈ P [t]) ∨ (x /∈ P [s, t] ∧ x ∈ P [t]) .
First, assume that s = t. Then we have x /∈ P [s] and y ∈ P [s] = A
and hence plev(x, s) = level(s) < Large = plev(y, t). Secondly, assume
s = t. Since P is closed under unions, we have x /∈ P [s]. Therefore,
P [s] = P [s, t] = P [t], that is s >P t. This implies that plev(x, s) =
level(s) < level(t) ≤ plev(y, t).
(b) By the deﬁnitions of P and 	P• , the assumption of (b) is equivalent
to
(s = t ∧ y ∈ P [t]) ∨ (y ∈ P [s, t] ∧ y /∈ P [t]) .
If s = t, thismeans thatx /∈ P [t] orP [t] = A. This implies that plev(x, s) =
level(s) and plev(y, t) ≥ level(s). Now, assume s = t. Then we have
P [t] = {x}. Since P is closed under unions, there are three cases:
(b1) P [s] = P [s, t] = {y} = P [t] ,
(b2) P [s] = P [s, t] = {x, y} = P [t] ,
(b3) P [s] = {y} ∧ P [s, t] = {x, y} .
In the cases (b1) and (b2), we have s >P t and plev(x, s) = level(s), so
that plev(x, s) < level(t) ≤ plev(y, t). In case (b3), we have s =P t, so
that plev(x, s) = level(s) ≤ level(t) ≤ plev(y, t). unionsq
TheoremG2A. Assume #Actions = 2. Policy P is maximin representable
if and only if it is closed under unions and the pair of relations (>P ,=P )
on States is acyclic.
Proof. The necessity of closure under unions was seen above. The ne-
cessity of acyclicity was proved in Lemma 13. Conversely, assume that
P is closed under unions and that (>P ,=P ) is acyclic. Then P is max-
imin represented by utility function plev introduced above because of
Lemmas 7 and 14. unionsq
Remark. Theorem 2 of [1] uses the same relations >P and =P . Instead of
acyclicity it requires “closure under chains”, a weak form of transitivity, and
“respect of domination”, a condition we do not encounter. unionsq
7 Concluding remarks
The paper [1] was the starting point for a beautiful mathematical theory, but
we needed predicate calculus to limit the number of case distinctions and
enhance the reliability of the proofs. Our main results were as follows. First
duality: an arbitrary policy P is maximin representable if and only if its dual
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is maximax representable. Theorem D: a deterministic policy P is maximin
representable if and only if P is closed under unions and relation ≺P• on
action-state pairs is acyclic. Theorem G: an arbitrary policy P is maximin
representable if and only ifP is closed under unions and the pair of relations
(≺P• ,	P• ) on action-state pairs is acyclic. Theorem DL: every deterministic
policy that is maximin or maximax representable is Laplace representable.
We treated the binary cases (those with only two actions) as corollaries
of the general cases. In particular, we conﬁrmed the result of [1] that a
deterministic binary policy is maximin representable if and only if it is
closed under unions.We proved that an arbitrary binary policyP ismaximin
representable if and only if it is closed under unions and the pair of relations
(>P ,=P ) on States is acyclic.
In the case with an arbitrary number of actions and only two states, we
proved that a deterministic policy is maximin representable if and only if it
satisﬁes the compromise rule.
Investigation of a number of nontrivial examples was indispensable for
a fruitful development of the theory. Inspired by Theorem DL, we won-
der whether the Laplace rules mentioned in Sect. 2 are sufﬁcient to imply
Laplace representability.
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